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Perhaps the most important feature of the information network known as the
World Wide Web' is not the ability of individuals and organizations to create their
own web sites containing hyperlinked pages of information, but the opportunity to
connect these pages to the pages of other sites.' In fact, as will be discussed in this
article, it has been argued that every owner of a site in this famously participatory
and interactive medium has implicitly granted to every other site owner the ability
to link to the owner's site.
However, despite the technological ease with which links can be created, their
use is precipitating a complex controversy in the law and culture of the Web: on
what legal grounds can the owner of the target site attack an unwanted link from a
linking site? Although few courts and commentators have addressed this issue, its
resolution undoubtedly will involve the extension of traditional concepts of
intellectual property to the new environment of cyberspace. Central to the
discussion are models for and characterizations of the Web's new modes of
contextualization. For instance, is a link merely the digital equivalent of a footnote
in a written work, or does it somehow involve a greater connection with, and
perhaps an infringement of the rights of, the creators of the target site?
Part I of this Article discusses the technical aspects of web-linking. Part II
examines the issues raised in four web-linking situations that led to court
proceedings. Parts III, IV, and V address, respectively, the copyright, trademark,
and privacy models for attacking unauthorized web-linking. Part VI offers a
practical and inexpensive solution, both cultural and legal, to some of these
concerns.
I.

THE TECHNOLOGY OF WEB-LINKING

A web site consists of a number ofinterconnected pages, each of which consists
of a separate computer display of textual information, graphic information, or both.
Because the computer allows viewers to "scroll through" a long document or image

1. The Internet is a system created by the federal government in 1969 to link "computers and
computer networks owned by military, defense contractors, and university laboratories conducting
defense-related research." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct.
2329 (1997).
The World Wide Web has been defined as "a collection ofprotocols and standards for accessing
information on the Internet, . . . [which is] the physical medium used to transport the data."
NET.GEMSlS &DEVRA HALL, BUILD A WEBsrE 5 (1995). It consists of"a series of documents stored
in different computers all over the Internet" whose interlinking has made it "currently the most
advanced information system developed on the Internet." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836. For an
examination of the structure of web sites and its legal implications, see Walter A. Effross, The Legal
Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Web Sites and the Uniform CommercialCode, 34 SAN
DIEGOL.REv. (forthcoming 1998) (discussing contract, warranty andjurisdictional issues arising from
sales of goods over the Internet).
2. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836-37 (observing that "[t]hese links from one computer to another,
from one document to another across the Internet, are what unify the Web into a single body of
knowledge, and what makes the Web unique").
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that extends beyond the border of the screen, a single web page can contain much
more than one screenful of information. The home page of a site corresponds to the
front door of a house or the front window of a store. Many visitors start their
explorations at the home page, proceeding to internal pages connected to the home
page through one link or a series of links.
Web pages are commonly created using HyperText Markup Language, often
abbreviated as HTML.3 Each page, whether a home page or an internal page, has
an address or "Uniform Resource Locator" (URL) that identifies its Web location
to users. They can type this URL string of letters and numbers into their web
browsers, such as Netscape Navigator or Internet Explorer, to reach that page.4
Whether one web page is linking to another page in its own site or to a page on
a different web site, the HTML programming for the hypertext link is fairly
straightforward: the site owner inserts a line of code containing the phrase "<A
HREF = "[URL of referred page [or site] inserted here]"> [text to be marked as the
link inserted here] </A>."5 As one handbook explains,
[t]he element marking a hypertext link is called an A, or anchor, element,
and the marked text is referred to as a hypertext anchor. The area between
the beginning <A> and ending </A> tags becomes a hot part of the
text.... [T]his section of text is displayed with an underline and usually
in a different color (often blue) .... Placing the mouse over this region and
clicking the mouse button ... causes the client to access the indicated
document or other Internet resource.6

3. See, e.g., IAN S. GRAHAM, THE HTML SOURCEBOOK ix (1995) (defining HTML as "the
markup language with which World Wide Web hypertext documents are written [and what] allows you
to create hypertext links, fill-in forms, and clickable images"). This Article does not address the
operation ofthe myriad new programs available through Internet service providers such as America OnLine or through software retailers that allow even an inexperienced user to build a web site without
actually directly programming in ofHTML code. See Effross, supranote 1 (examining the commercial
implications of this development); see also Steve Glaser & Elizabeth Lewis, Things to Know, Do &
Avoid Before Buildinga Web Page, 5 PC NOVICE GUIDE TO BUILDING WEB SrrEs 13, 13-15 (1997)
[hereinafter PC NovicE GUIDE] ("It used to be that the only way to create a Web site was to write the
HTML code. Today there are a number of programs that allow you to simply drag and drop elements

together ....

These Web editors, as they are called, handle the creation of HTML code in the

background where you needn't worry about it.").
4. Generally, the home page of a commercial entity is of the form "http://www.[company's
name].com" such as "http://www.bamesandnoble.com" or"http://www.kraftfoods.com." The internal
pages usually add characters at the end of the designation for the site's home page, for example,
"http://www.[company's name]/ihtml/mainllegal.html."
5. See, e.g., ADAM BLu,,BULDINGBusiNSS WEB SrrEs 87-88 (1996) (explaining howto build
hypertext links); DAVID COOK& DEBORAH SELLERS, LAUNCHINGABuSINESS ONTHEWEB 566-67 (2d
ed. 1996) (explaining the use of link programming). Links can also take a visitor from one area in a
page to another. For example, the bottom of a long page which a visitor has scrolled through might
contain a helpful link back to the top of that document.
6. GRAHAM, supranote 3, at 21.
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By only a slightly more complicated procedure, the site owner can designate a
graphic image or icon as the link to be selected. That is, after the user clicks on the
icon, the user's "browser reads the code, goes out to the Internet and tracks down
the web page that matches the address, and makes a request for a copy of that web
page. The computer running the linked web page sends the copy back to the user's
browser, and the browser reads the code and assembles the page on the user's
computer screen."7 This process usually happens very quickly, unless a large
amount of textual or graphic material is involved. Unless users check their
browsers' URL display for the page that they are not viewing, the process is also
"transparent" to the users; they generally cannot determine whether or not the link
has transferred them from one web site to another.
How can the owners of a site determine which sites are linking to theirs? One
easy way to track this information (although it offers no guarantees of being current
or complete) is through the web site presenting the HotBot s search engine, which
can present a list of pages that link to any other given page on the Web. For
example, on February 12, 1998, this facility revealed 23,559 links to the home page
of bookseller Amazon.com, 15,638 links to the home page ofthe Playboy magazine
web site, and 6,556 links to the American Civil Liberties Union home page.
This Article assumes for purposes of simplicity that an unauthorized link is
made from a page of the linking site to a page of the target site, and not to a page
of another site that contains material concerning the owner of the target site. That
is, the situations considered are those that involve A's complaint against B for B's
constructing a link an a page or pages of B's site to a page or pages of A's site,
rather than linking B's site to a page or pages of C's site that somehow concern A.

7. See Rebecca Quick, How a Link Works, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1997, at B6 (summarizing how
a link works and indicating that a visitor to a web page can examine that page's coding by "go[ing] to
the 'View' button on your browser and then click[ing] on the 'Document Source' or 'Source'
command") An additional wrinde is that the information may be supplied by a "cached" copy. See
American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concerning a constitutional
challenge to a state statute prohibiting dissemination of obscene material to minors over the Internet).
In American Libraries the court explained "caching" as "the Internet practice of storing partial or
complete duplicates of materials from frequently accessed sites to avoid repeatedly requesting copies
from the original server. The recipient has no means of distinguishing between the cached materials and
the original."Id. at 171. For adetailed discussion of caching techniques and the World Wide Web, see
Richard S. Vermut, File Cachingon the Internet: TechnicalInfringementor SafeguardforEfficient
Network Operation?,4 J. INTLL. PROP. L. 273 (1997).

8. Hotbot: The Wired Search Center (visited Mar. 16, 1998) <http://www.hotbot.com>. The
home page of this site offers a pull-down menu of items to "look for," one of which is "links to this
URL."Id. By selecting this option and typing into the HotBot search engine the URL of the target site,
the visitor can find a list of, and links to, many sites linking to that page.
9. Because several links to the same target page may originate from different pages in one linking
site, or even from different pages of the target site itself, these numbers provide only a raw indication
of the total number of separate web sites linking to the target page.
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II. WEB-LINKING LITIGATION

As of February 1998, the issue ofunwelcomed linking had been litigated before
four courts, the first of them outside the United States. Each of these controversies
involved a different aspect of unwelcomed linking.
A. DirectLinking I: The Shetland Times Case'0
In October 1995, the Shetland News (News), a newspaper whose printed
version addressed concerns in the Scottish Islands, added to its web site links that

reproduced verbatim the headlines of articles available on the rival Shetland Times
(Times) newspaper's web site." Visitors who followed these links from the News
site would find themselves viewing the corresponding articles on the Times site, but
they would then be directed back to the News site through another link without
passing through the Times' home page or viewing any advertisements placed on the
Times' web site by the Times' advertisers.' 2 Especially galling to the editors ofthe
Times was that visitors who reached the Times reports through the News site might
have been given the erroneous impression that the two newspapers were affiliated.
Although the Times articles still carried a Times logo, the News had removed the
Times "frame" (the surrounding visual material) and had not advised the News
visitors that the link to these stories was transferring them to the Times site.' 3
At a preliminary or "interim interdict" stage of the case on October 24, 1996,
Lord Hamilton of the Court of Sessions (Outer House) agreed that the Times had
"a prima facie case that the incorporation by [the News] in their Web site of the
headlines provided at [the Times'] web site constitutes an infringement of[a statute
prohibiting] the inclusion in a cable programme service of protected cable
programmes."' 4 The court rejected the News' argument that it had been the News
and not the Times that had sent the information from the Times' web site by noting

10. Shetland Times, Ltd. v. Wills, F.S.R. 604, 1997 S.L.T. 669 (Outer House Oct. 24, 1996),
available in LEXIS, Scot Library, Cases File. These allegations appear on the web page that the
Shetland Times setup to demonstrate the operation of the Shetland News site. See The ShetlandTimes
Online (visited Mar. 6, 1998) <http://www.shetland-times.co.ukstlinternet/legal.htm>.
11. Shetland Times, at *3.
12. Id. at *4.
13. See Charles R. Merrill & Robert J. Burger, Keeping the Chain Unbroken, INTELL. PROP.
MAG. (Feb. 1997) (visited Mar. 16,1998) <http://www.ipmag.commerrill.html> (discussingShetland
Times).
14. Shetland Times, at *5.The Times established that its web site qualified as a "cable programme service" that "consists wholly or mainly in sending visual images, sounds or other information
by means ofatelecommunications system, otherwise thanby wireless telegraphy" to multiple recipients
or to the public at large. Id.The court found inapplicable the exception from this definition for services
which had the "essential feature" of feedback by the recipients: "While the facility to comment or
make suggestions via the Internet exists, this does not appear to me to be an essential element in the
service, the primary function of which is to distribute news and other items." Id.
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[i]fthe information is being sent, it prima facie is being sent by the [Times]
on whose web site it has been established. The fact that the information is
provided to the caller by his accessing itthrough the [News'] web site does
not, in my view, result in the [News'] being the person sending the
information.' 5
Notably, the court concluded that
[i]t was fundamental to the setting up by the [Times] oftheir web site that
access to their material should be gained only by accessing their web
directly. While there has been no loss to date, there is a clear prospect of
loss of potential advertising revenue in the foreseeable future.... There
was, in the circumstances, no substance, in my view, in the suggestion that
[the Times was] gaining an advantage by their newspaper items being
made available more readily through [the News'] web site. 6
Under the terms of the settlement of the case,' 7 the News was not barred from
linking. However, it agreed that it would qualify its linking through headlines on
its site to stories on the Times' web site as follows:
a. each link to any individual story shall be acknowledged by the legend
"A Shetland Times Story" appearing underneath each headline and of
the same or similar size as the headline;
b. adjacent to any such headline or headlines there shall appear a button
showing legibly the Shetland Times masthead logo; and
c. the legend and the button shall each be hypertext links to the Shetland
Times online headline page.' 8
9
B. DirectLinking .I:Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.'

Although less invasive than the conduct of Shetland News, Microsoft's
unauthorized linking to an unaltered internal page of the Ticketmaster web site was
no less welcomed.2" On April 28, 1997, the online ticket-seller Ticketmaster filed
suit against Microsoft in the District Court for the Central District of California,
alleging that after "[n]egotiations with Microsoft for an agreement allowing
Microsoftto profit from linkage to and associationwith Ticketmaster's name, marks

15. Id.
16. Id. at *6.
17. The ShetlandTimes, Publisher'sStatement, InternetDisputeSettled (last modified Nov. 11,
1997) <http://www.shetland-times.co.uk/st/intemet.htm>.
18. Id.
19. No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D. Cal. 1997).
20. Microsoft's unauthorized linking initiated litigation that was continuing as of early 1998.
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and web site [had] failed, ... Microsoft is making use of such linkage and
'
association as a freerider and in express contravention of Ticketmaster's request."21
The exhibits to the Complaint indicate that this linkage involved Microsoft's
including on its "Seattle Sidewalk" city guide siteP links to Ticketmaster's site.'
Visitors who inserted the term "Ticketmaster" into the search engine on the Seattle
Sidewalk site obtained search result pages listing the physical locations of
Ticketmaster outlets with a link to a separate page for each of those locations.24
Each of the linked pages offered the identical short article on the virtues of
Ticketmaster, the disputed link to Ticketmaster's external web site, and, along its
right border, a series of advertisements placed by Microsoft containing links to
various other attractions in the Seattle area.'
Ticketmaster alleged that by linking to the Ticketmaster web site, Microsoft had
"utilized... the name and marks of Ticketmaster and Ticketmaster's web site
notwithstanding Ticketmaster's protestation against such use and Microsoft's
implicit recognition that, absent an agreement with the owner for use of a web site,
web sites are for personal non-commercial use"26 and that Microsoft had thereby
"enhanced the value of Microsoft's web site and business and diluted and
diminished the value of Ticketmaster's web site and business.... [by] depriving
Ticketmaster of favorable advertising business and opportunities."27 That is, as in
Shetland Times, Microsoft's direct link to Ticketmaster's site allowed visitors to
bypass Ticketmaster's other pages, and thus to skip the advertising on those pages.
Ticketmaster thus sought relief under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act,2" the California
Business and Professions Code,29 and the California common law of unfair
competition and unfair business practices."
In its Answer, Microsoft asserted as an affirmative defense that "[a]ny business,
such as Ticketmaster, participating in the Internet and the World Wide Web invites

21. Ticketmaster's First Amended Complaint para. 16, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D. Cal. 1997).
22. See id. app. C; Seattle.Sidewalk (visited Mar 6. 1998) <http://www.seattle.sidewalk.com/>.
23. Ticketmaster's First Amended Complaint para. 16, Ticketmaster (No. 97-3055 DDP).
24. See Seattle.Sidewalk, supra note 22; Sidewalk Entries Containing "Ticketmnaster": Seattle
Sidewalk (visited Mar. 6, 1998 )
<http://seattle.sidewalk.com/directory?FID=185ID=l 1878FTS--ticketmaster>.
25. See Ticketmaster's Amended Complaint para. 16, Ticketmaster (No. 97-3055 DDP);
Ticketmaster at BlockbusterMusic-Bellevue (visited Mar. 6, 1998)
<http://seattle.sidewalk.com/detail/10877>. Currently, if one selects the link from Seattle Sidewalk to
Ticketmaster.com, the Ticketmaster logo appears, but Ticketmasterhas blocked access by labeling this
page as an unauthorized link and a dead-end page. See DeadEnd Page (visited Mar. 6, 1998)
<http://ticketing.ticketmaster.com/restricted/index.html>.
26. Ticketmaster's First Amended Complaint para. 18, Ticketmaster (No. 97-3055 DDP).

27. Id. para. 19.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) (1994 & Supp. 11995).

29. CAL. BUS. &PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (West 1997).
30. SeeTicketmaster'sFirstAmendedComplaintparas. 20-28, Ticketmaster(No. 97-3055 DDP)
(setting forth the alleged grounds for relief).
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other participants to use the business' Internet addresses and URLs to contact it."'3'
Indeed, it continued,
Microsoft does not use Ticketmaster's Web Site. Microsoft does not
access, incorporate or redistribute Ticketmaster Web Page documents. All
Microsoft does is provide viewers of its own Web Pages with the URLs for
other Web Pages on the Internet, including some operated by Ticketmaster,
that the viewer may find of interest. Whether or not the viewer accesses a
Ticketmaster Web Page document is up to the viewer. Whether or not
Ticketmaster displays the Web Page document to the viewer is up to
Ticketmaster. Microsoft is not a party to the communication between the
viewer and Ticketmaster.32
... Moreover, at any time it chose, Ticketmaster had the power to
refuse access to any of its Web pages. Ticketmaster voluntarily and
knowingly chose not to refuse access. Ticketmaster has publicly
acknowledged that it possesses the capability to refuse access and that it
voluntarily elected not to do so.33
Among Microsoft's numbered affirmative defenses were Ticketmaster's assumption
of the risk of such linkage; estoppel of Ticketmaster from making a claim based on
the conduct; fair use, nominative fair use, noncommercial use, and news reporting
under the Lanham Act; and the protection of the First Amendment for the
commercial speech of providing "basic information and commentary"34 about
Ticketmaster. s
Ticketmaster's Reply insisted that "Ticketmaster's Web Site on the World
Wide Web was provided pursuant to certain restrictions and understandings,
including the limitation that it was to be used for personal, non-commercial use
only, and was not provided for the competing, commercial use of Microsoft" and

that following Microsoft's continued use ofTicketmaster name, mark, and web site
in express contravention of Ticketmaster's request to discontinue such use,
"Ticketmaster was required to expend its own resources to block Microsoft's direct
access to Ticketmaster's Web Site, subject to such further contravention of
'
Ticketmaster's request as Microsoft may be able to accomplish."36
At a status hearing held on February 2, 1998, a trial of this matter was
scheduled for the fall of 1998.

31. Microsoft's Answer para. 43, Ticketmaster (No. 97-3055 DDP).
32. Id. para. 45.
33. Id. para. 46.
34. Id. para. 74.
35. Id. paras. 51-75.
36. Ticketmaster's Reply to Microsoft's Counterclaim para. 46, Ticketmaster (No. 97-3055
DDP); see also supra note 25 (detailing the results of Ticketmaster's technological blockage of
Microsofts link).
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37
C. Framing: Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc.

If the ShetlandTimes and Ticketmaster litigations involved unauthorized links
to the "de-framed" and the unaltered pages of the target site, respectively, Total
News concerned a clearly more intrusive practice: the defendant's linking site

"framed" the pages of the target site, so that a visitor to the linked target site would

see those pages surrounded by material created by the linking site.38
On February 20, 1997, the Washington Post filed suit against Total News,
alleging "blatant acts of misappropriation, trademark dilution and infringement,
willful copyright violations, and other related tortious acts ... in connection with
th[e] operation of a parasitic site know as 'totalnews.com' on that portion of the
' At the core of the
Internet known as the World Wide Web."39
"parasitism" alleged
was the defendant's practice of 'framing' that causes Plaintiffs' websites to appear
not in the form that Plaintiffs intended, but in an altered form designed by
Defendants for their own economic advantage." 0 That is, when a visitor to
totalnews.com clicked on a hyperlink bearing the name of one of the plaintiffs
publications, the Washington Post site
does not then fill the screen as it would had the user accessed Plaintiff s
site either directly or by means of a hyperlink from a website that does not
"frame" linked sites. Nor does Plaintiff's URL appear at the top of the
screen as it normally would. Instead, part of Plaintiff's site is inserted in a
window designed by Defendants to occupy only a portion of the screen.
Masking part of Plaintiffs site is the totalnews.com "frame," including,
interalia,the "Total News" logo, totalnews.com URL, and advertisements
that others have purchased from Defendants."
In this fashion, "by juxtaposing advertising sold by Defendants against
advertising sold by Plaintiffs on their own sites, and by obscuring the advertising
on Plaintiff s sites, Defendants directly compete against Plaintiffs and interfere with
Plaintiffs contractual relationships with their advertisers."42 Not only were the
plaintiffs' various sites unable to escape completely the framing effects of Total
News, but they could find "no assurance that in the fast-changing world of the
Internet... any technological steps they take to avoid framing will succeed in
ensuring that Plaintiff s sites remain consistently visible inthe way they intended." 3
Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged the following causes of action:

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Washington Post's Complaint para. 30, Washington Post Co. (No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL)).
Id. para. 1.
Id. para. 30.
Id.
Id. para. 36.
Id. para. 37.
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misappropriation; federal trademark dilution and infringement; false designations
of origin, false representations, and false advertising in violation of the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act; trademark infringement and unfair competition, dilution, and
deceptive acts and practices under New York state law; copyright infringement; and
tortious interference. 44
The suit was settled on June 5, 1997. 4s The settlement specifically called for the
defendants not to "frame" any of the plaintiff's web sites46 or to "link to any page
of any website in any way that purposefully or overtly encourages users, once at a
non-Plaintiff's site, to link to any Plaintiff s website... ." Notably, the settlement
also provided:
Plaintiffs agree that Defendants may link from the Totalnews.com
website or any other website to any Plaintiff s website, provided that:
(a) Defendants may link to Plaintiffs' websites only via hyperlinks
consisting ofthe names of the linked sites in plain text, which may
be highlighted;
(b) Defendants may not use on any website, as hyperlinks or in any
other way, any of Plaintiff s proprietary logos or other distinctive
graphics, video or audio material, nor may Defendants otherwise
link in any manner reasonably likely to: (i) imply affiliation with,
endorsement or sponsorship by any Plaintiff; (ii) cause confusion,

mistake or deception; (iii) dilute Plaintiff's marks; or (iv)
otherwise violate state or federal law. 48
D. Implying Authorization to Use ProtectedSymbols: ACLU v. Miller49
Although issues of unauthorized linking are only beginning to reach the courts,
one state's legislative attempt to resolve them has already been struck down as
overbroad.
In September 1996, a coalition of plaintiffs-including The American Civil
Liberties Union of Georgia, The AIDS Survival Project,and the Electronic Frontier

44. Washington Post's Complaint paras. 38-76, Washington Post (No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL)).
45. Law of the Internet (visited Mar. 7, 1998) <http://www.ljx.comlintemet.totalse.htm>
(containing a copy ofthe Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal, No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL)).
46. Id. para.3.
47. Id. para. 6. Under the terms of the settlement, this provision would be violated if the
defendants "state[d] on their website that a Plaintiffs website could be reached with two clicks--the
first click taking the user to a third-party website, and the second click taking the user, via a hyperlink
supplied by the third party, to a Plaintiff swebsite that would then be seen through Defendants' frame."
Id. However, it would be permissible for the defendants to "simply provid[e] a hypertext link, using
frames technology, to a website page other than a Plaintiff's website, from which the user on her own
is able to, and does, link to a Plaintiffs website in a manner permitted by law." Id.
48. Id. para. 4.
49. No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS (N.D. Ga. 1996).
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Foundation-filed a constitutional challenge in the district court for the Northern
District of Georgia s° against a Georgia state criminal statute providing that it is
unlawful to knowingly:
transmit any data through a computer network... for the purpose of
setting up, maintaining, operating, or exchanging data with an electronic
mailbox, home page, or any other electronic information storage bank or
point of access to electronic information if such data uses any individual
name, trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or
copyrighted symbol... which would falsely state or imply that such person
...has permission or is legally authorized to use such trade name,
registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol for

suchS1purpose when such permission or authorization has not been obtained
Emphasizing that "[t]he critical linking feature is the defining characteristic of
the Web,"52 the plaintiffs raised the following objections to the statute: it did not
define the phrase "uses" or "to use";53 nor did it require, as did other federal and
Georgia trademark and trade name statutes, "that the prohibited 'use' create any
likelihood of confusion as to the identity of the user, nor that the use in any way
dilute the value of a famous and distinctive mark, nor that the 'use' be in the context
of a commercial transaction for the sale of goods and services"; and it54did not
require "that the user have any intent to deceive the public by this 'use.'
More specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the statute provided no method to
determine "whether a web page that provides a link to a page containing a
registered trade name or logo is a prohibited 'use' ofthe logo under the Act."55 Nor
did it define the phrase "falsely implies" to indicate "whether any particular 'use'
of a trade name or logo in a web page would 'falsely imply' that the user had

50. ACLU's Complaint, ACLU(No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS). For ACLU filings and related court
materials, see Cyber-Liberties: Online CensorshipPage (visited Mar. 7, 1998)
<http:llwww.aclu.orglissues/cyber/censor.html>. For Georgia's filings and related court materials, see
Georgia'sDefense of Its InternetFraudStatute (visited Mar. 6, 1998)
<http://www.inteliview.com/fraudlaw.htm>.
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1(a) (1996). This Article does not examine the Complaint's
allegations against the statute's restrictions on anonymous or pseudonymous online communication
through barring the adoption of "any individual name, trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or
official seal, or copyrighted symbol to falsely identify the person, organization, or representative
transmitting such data." Id. In its Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
the State asserted that "the present Georgia statute does not prohibit anonymity on the Internet." Brief
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Part I.B n.1, ACLU v. Miller (N.D. Ga.
1997) (No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS).
52. ACLU's Complaint at 8,ACLU (No. 1:96-CV-2475-MIIS).
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id.

55. Id.
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obtained prior permission to link to the owner's web page or to use the trade name
or logo in some other way., 5 6 Such indeterminacy would clearly pose a challenge
to many of the plaintiffs.5 7 They argued that the statute violated their state
constitutional rights to free expression, association, access to information, and
privacy; was unconstitutionally overbroad and impermissibly vague; and imposed
a burden on interstate commerce in violation of the United States Constitution.5 8
To prevent the enforcement of the statute, the plaintiffs emphasized that its
restriction on the use of trade names, logos, and affiliated marks
is not confined to commercial use of trade names[,I logos, etc., nor does
the Act require intent to deceive or any actual deception ....
The Act's language is so broad, therefore, that it appears to prohibit
even clearly noncommercial use of names and logos to provide links in
web pages in the absence of express permission from the corporations,
organizations, or agencies to whom the links lead. Many of the plaintiffs
use trade names or logos in this manner to create links for noncommercial
purposes, and in many cases their use of these trade names or logos occurs
in the context of political speech, religious speech, news and commentary,
and other public interest and educational expression. It would be
practically impossible for plaintiffs and other web publishers to obtain
permission for all the links in their web sites, and eliminating links would
destroy the most useful and acclaimed feature of the World Wide Web. 9
In response, the State asserted that
[d]uring the legislative process, the sponsor of the Bill consistently
explained that the Bill did not address, and was not intended to address, the
links between web sites or the addresses that are set up on home pages or

electronic mailboxes, but only to prevent people from misidentifying
themselves or misrepresenting that their home page is the home page of

56. Id.
57. For example, "[t]he ACLU of Georgia's site provides a collection of links to other related
Internet sites.... The ACLU did not obtain permission before linking to these sites, and it would be
practically impossible to obtain such permission for each link." Id. at 13. Similarly, the complaint
noted:
As a result ofthe Act's prohibition against using trade names, trademarks, logos,
or legal or official seals without permission, the AIDS survival project [sic] feels
its web page, composed of links to other organizations' web pages, may be in
conflict with the law. Thus, the Act has caused the AIDS Survival Project to
curtail its efforts to create its web page.
Id. at 14.
58. ACLU's Complaint at 25, ACLU (No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS).
59. Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9 (citations omitted), ACLU (No.
1:96-CV-2475-MHS).
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another person or organization when it is not."
The statute's legislative history indicated an intent only to prevent the owner of a
web site from falsely identifying himself or his affiliations on his own site."' The
State claimed that it "was specifically explained by the sponsor and the proponents
ofthe Bill during the floor debates that the Bill did not apply to mere hypertext links
on the Internet."62 The State also attempted to clarify that the Act prohibits sites
"which misidentify the person by... falsely stating or implying that the person has
permission or is authorized to use the trade names and logos.., when the person
has no such permission or authorization"6' but that
[t]he hypertext links commonly used on the World Wide Web are, without
the injection of fraud or misrepresentation, merely references to the
computer site and computer address of another person or entity on the
Internet or Web. Without the injection of the knowing and intentional
misappropriation of another's identity or identifying mark into such [a]
situation, the statute poses no obstacle to innocent links."

60. Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, ACLU(No. 1:96-

CV-2475-MHS).
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 5. The state argues that: as thus construed, the Act was constitutional because false and
misleading speech is not protected by the First Amendment; the Act applied only to nonexpressive, and
thus unprotected, conduct; even if the Act did apply to protected speech, it is a constitutional time,
place, or manner restriction; and it was narrowly tailored to effect the State's interest. Id. at 8-12.

63. Id. at 19.
64. Id. at 20. A number of affidavits were introduced by the State to support its limited
interpretation of the Act's scope. For access to and a listing of all affidavits, see Georgia'sDefense of
Its InternetFraudStatute, supra note 50. See Affidavit of Robert E. Keller para. 4, ACLU(No. 1:96CV-2475-MHS) (District Attorney of Clayton Judicial Circuit) (stating that
As a Georgia criminal prosecutor, I do not see how any Georgia criminal
prosecutor could reasonably read [the Act] to apply to ... mere links between one
person's computer page to that ofanother person, when there is no knowing false
identification of oneself as another or misappropriation of another's identifying
mark or symbol without permission or authority.);
Affidavit of Roy H. Watson, Jr. para. 5,ACLU(No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS) (Representative to Georgia
House of Representatives) (stating that in drafting and enacting the Act "[t]here was... no intent to
prohibit mere links between different addresses on the Internet"); Affidavit of Robert Ray para. 5,
ACLU(No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS) (Representative to Georgia House of Representatives) (indicating
that "during the Legislature's consideration of House Bill 1630, 1 understood the Bill only to seek to
prevent fraudulent misidentification or misrepresentation on the Interet, and not to prevent
pseudonyms or anonymous communications or links on a home page to other sites on the Internet");
AffidavitofDon Parsons para. 15,ACLU(No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS) (Representativeto GeorgiaHouse
of Representatives) (recalling that
[d]uring the debate on the floor of the House of Representatives, and throughout
the legislative process, I explicitly and consistently explained that House Bill
1630... had nothing to do with links between web sites on the Internet, but only
with someone misrepresenting that their home page is the home page of another
person or organization when it was not);
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Yet the plaintiffs seized on precisely this inconsistency in reiterating that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague: "[n]either of these statements resolves the
question of whether maintenance of a site on the World Wide Web that uses a trade
name or logo to create a link to another site would be a violation of the Act because
it 'falsely implies' permission to65create the link or because it 'misappropriat[es]
another's... identifying mark."'
On June 20, 1997, the court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the
enforcement of the Act.' Agreeing with the plaintiffs that the statute as written was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and that the State's efforts to rehabilitate
it were tangled, the court found that
even if the statute could constitutionally be used to prosecute persons who
intentionally "falsely identify" themselves in order to deceive or defraud
the public, or to persons whose commercial use of trade names and logos
creates a substantial likelihood of confusion or the dilution of a famous
mark, the statute is nevertheless overbroad because it operates
unconstitutionally for a substantial category of the speakers it covers.67
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that the State had offered divergent
interpretations of the web-linking provision and noted that
[a] fair reading of the clause, as written, is that it prohibits the current use
of web page links. The linking function requires publishers of web pages
to include symbols designating other web pages which may be of interest
to a user. This means that an entity or person's seal may appear on
hundreds or thousands of other web pages, just for the purpose of enabling
the linking system. The appearance of the seal, although completely
innocuous, would definitely "imply" to many users that permission for use
hadbeen obtained. Defendants have articulated no compelling state interest

Affidavit of James M. Skipper, Jr. para. 7,ACLU (No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS), (Representative to
Georgia House of Representatives) (indicating that "during the Legislature's consideration of House
Bill 1630, I understood the Bill only to seek to prevent fraudulentmisidentification or misrepresentation
on the Internet, and not to prevent pseudonyms or anonymous communications or links on a home page
to other sites on the Internet"); Affidavit of Thomas E. Lawrence para. 6, ACLU (No. 1:96-CV-2475MHS) (Representative to Georgia House of Representatives) (indicating that "[i]t was not, and is not,
my understanding, that House Bill 1630 (Act 1029) prohibits .. mere links between different
addresses on the Internet, where there is no intentional misrepresentation of one's self as someone

else").
65. Reply in Support ofMotion for Preliminary Injunction at 9,ACLU(No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS)
(quoting the statute).
66. Order, ACLU (No. 1:96-CV-2475-MHS).
67. Id. at 4.
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that would be furthered by restricting the linking function in this way.6"
On August 7, 1997, the court entered an order permanently enjoining the State from
enforcing the Act.
Because the Shetland Times decision was handed down by a foreign court, the
Washington Post litigation was settled, and the Ticketmaster case is currently
pending (and might be settled), there is no direct precedent yet available to support
an action by the owner of a site to which an unwelcomed link has been made.
Moreover, the Miller decision suggests that legislation to protect site-owners from
such links must be carefully drafted and will almost certainly be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Parts III, IV, and V of this Article examine the ways in which a site-owner may

ground an action against the linker in established precedent from the areas of
copyright, trademark, and tort law, respectively.
III. THE COPYRIGHT MODEL
Under the United States Copyright Act69 the owner of a copyrighted work has
the following exclusive rights: to reproduce, and authorize reproductions of, the
work;7" prepare derivative works based upon the original work;" distribute copies
of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending;72 and, "in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works," to perform or display the copyrighted work publicly. 3 A person who
violates any of these exclusive rights has infringed the copyright74 and is subject to
76
75
legal action by the holder of the copyright for direct or contributory

68. Id. at4n.5.
69. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).

70. Id. § 106(1).
71. Id. § 106(2). The Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, artreproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
Id. § 101.
72. Id. § 106(3).
73. Id. § 106(4), (5).
74. Id. § 501(a).

75. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994).
76. See Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,435 (1984) (indicating
that
[t]he absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude
the imposition ofliability for copyright infringement on certain parties who have
not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious liability is
imposed in all areas of the law and the concept of contributory infringement is
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infringement.
The plaintiff in a copyright infringement action must prove that the copied
material is copyrightable, that he secured the copyright (for example, by producing
a federal copyright registration certificate77), and that the defendant has copied it.78
Significantly, proving the defendant's knowledge or intent forms no part of the
plaintiff's action for direct copyright infringement.7 9
The "fair use" exception to copyright infringement allows the reproduction,
distribution, and display of copyrighted material "for purposes such as criticism,
comment news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research . . . ."'o The test for fair use is fact-specific, but the
Copyright Act directs courts to consider at least the following four factors in their
evaluation:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."'
A. Infringement by UnauthorizedReproduction
Whether the defendant has in fact produced a copy of the plaintiff's work
constitutes a central element in copyright infringement suits concerning digitized
information such as software. Although the photocopying of written materials and
duplication of audio or video recordings clearly satisfy this requirement, whether
the reproduction of their digital equivalents does so is less clear.
The Copyright Act defines "copies" as "material objects.., in which a work
is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the

merely a species ofthe broader problem ofidentifying the circumstances in which
it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.);
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)
(predicating contributory copyright liability on a finding that a party "with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.. . ") (footnote
omitted); Sega Enters. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (observing that"[a]lthough
the CopyrightAct does not expressly impose liability on anyone otherthan direct infringers, courts have
long recognized that in certain circumstances, liability for contributory infringement will be
imposed.... Contributory copyright infringement stems from the notion that one who directly
contributes to another's infringement should be held liable") (citation omitted).
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 410 (1994) (setting forth the registration and certification process).
78. See, e.g., Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating
the elements of infringement).

79. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1994).
80. Id. § 107.
81. Id.
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aid of a machine or device." 2 For these purposes,
[a] work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or
both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a
fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission. 3
There is no question that copyright law applies to the unauthorized reproduction
through the Internet of material that originally appeared in another medium. An
early decision in this area, Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, 4 found the
defendant liable for copyright infringement for posting various portions of the
copyrighted spiritual writings of higher levels of the Scientology practice on the
Internet. 5 The court stated:
The law of copyright has evolved with technological change, with each
new technological advancement creating complicated questions of
copyright interpretation and application. Nevertheless, the new
technologies-from television, to video cassette recorders, to- digitized
transmissions-have been made to fit within the overall scheme of
copyright law and to serve the ends which copyright was intended to
promote. The Internet is no exception, and postings on it must be judged
in reference to the already flexible considerations which fair use affords. 6
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that "a 'copying' for purposes of
copyright law occurs when a computer program is transferred from a permanent
storage device to a computer's RAM" ' (Random Access Memory), even though
such memory is "fixed" only temporarily and vanishes when the computer's power
is turned offill Thus, the court found that copyright infringement occurred when
82. Id. § 101.
83. Id.
84. No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131 (E.D. Va. 1996).
85. Id. at*15.
86. Id. at *4 (citations omitted). However, this decision did not address the specifics of the
infingement, such as the form of dissemination. Lerma apparently did not put the material on his own
web site but instead supplied it to various public news groups on the Internet. Id. at * 10. In addition,
although Lerma's Internet service provider was originally named as a defendant on grounds of
copyright infringement, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claim against that entity. Id. at *2.
87. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); see also In re
Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (D. Kan. 1995) (agreeing with the court's
holding in MAISys. Corp.); Advanced Computer Serv. of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356, 363-64 (E.D. Va. 1994) (following the decision in MAISys. Corp.).
88. MAISys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 519 ("RAM can be simply defined as a computer component in
which data and computer programs can be temporarily recorded. ... It is a property ofRAM that when
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service technicians, who were not authorized to use MAI's diagnostic software
products, caused those programs to be transferred into the RAM oftheir customers'
computers by the simple process of turning on those computers.89
Does the linking of one site to another similarly produce a copy that would give
rise to a copyright action against an unauthorized linker for creating an
unauthorized copy or reproduction of material on the target site? In this context, two
sets of copyright decisions are instructive: those concerning copyright infringement
actions brought against the owners of computerized "bulletin boards" and those
brought against the owners of web sites.
1.

Infringement Through Bulletin Boards

The first wave of copyright cases concerning the Internet involved bulletin
board services (3BS) 9 that enabled their users to obtain pirated digital copies of
video games or erotic images.9' Beyond reinforcing the general applicability of
copyright law to the Internet, the following decisions focus onthe operator's control
over his BBS and the applicability of its contents to web-linking. In particular, site
owners should note the absence of any scienter requirement for a finding of direct
infringement.
In PlayboyEnterprises,Inc. v. Frena,2 Frena, the defendant operator of a BBS,
made his computer available to paying subscribers who electronically connected
their computers to his through a modem to "upload" (store) and "download"
(retrieve) digitized information.' Exact or near-exact copies of various
photographic images whose copyright was held by Playboy had been posted on the
service. Frena denied furnishing these materials and attributed their presence to his
subscribers.94 The court found, nonetheless, that the defendant had infringed

the computer is turned off,the copy of the program recorded in RAM is lost." (quoting Apple Computer
Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984))).
89. MAISys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518; see also Advanced Computer Serv., 845 F. Supp. at 360
(observing that .'[1]oading' or 'booting' the software entails a transfer of the software program from
a storage device such as a hard disk or floppy disk into the random access memory ("RAM") of the
computer").
90. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The CaseAgainst CopyrightLiabilityofBulletin BoardOperators, 13 CARDOZOARTS
&ENT. L.J. 345, 347 n.5 (1995) (defining "bulletin board system" as "an on-line service that allows
users to exchange messages, texts, computer programs, photographs, music, and other forms of
information by uploading materials from the user's computer to the system and by downloading
materials from the BBS to his own computer").
91. Id. at 347.
92. 839 F.Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
93. Id. at 1554.
94. Id.Nonetheless, many of the files were identified with the registered trademarks "Playboy"
and "Playmate," and their contents marked with Frena's name and telephone number of his BBS. See
infra note 189 and accompanying text.
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Playboy's exclusive right to display and distribute these images."
There is irrefutable evidence of direct copyright infringement in this
case. It does not matter that Defendant Frena may have been unaware of
the copyright infringement. Intent to infringe is not needed to find
copyright infringement. Intent or knowledge is not an element of
infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable for
infringement; rather, innocence is significant to a trial court when it fixes
statutory damages, which is a remedy equitable in nature.96
Frena could not avail himself of the fair use exception to infringement because
he had made the material on the bulletin board available for a commercial purpose;
the images were deemed works of "fiction and fantasy" and thus less susceptible to
the fair use exception than those of fact; the images were an essential part of the
published version of Playboy magazine; and their online distribution would affect
the market for Playboy's printed version.9
Nor did defendants' greater involvement in Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Russ
Hardenburgh,Inc.9" insulate them from liability. The operators of this board
awarded increased downloading privileges to subscribers who uploaded electronic
information, and also had employees review these "new files to ascertain whether
they were 'acceptable,' meaning, not pornographic, and not blatantly protected by
copyright."" The court found that
[t]hese two facts transform Defendants from passive providers of a
space in which infiinging activities happened to occur to active participants
in the process of copyright infringement.... It is inconsistent [for them]
to argue that one may actively encourage and control the uploading and
dissemination of adult files, but cannot [be] held liable for copyright
violations because it is too difficult to determine which files infringe upon
someone else's copyrights."°

95. Id. at 1556-57. Not only was Frena's direct responsibility for making the copies irrelevant
to the question of whether or not he had infringed Playboy's copyright by distributing the images, but
the court's examination of the Copyright Act's legislative history revealed that "ft]he display right
precludes unauthorized transmission of the display from one place to another, for example, by a
computer system." Id. at 1557. Frena was also found to have infringed Playboy's right to reproduce
these images: "There is no dispute that Defendant Frena supplied a product containing unauthorized
copies of a copyrighted work. It does not matter that Defendant Frena claims he did not make the copies
itself [sic]." Id. at 1556.
96. Id. at 1559.
97. Id. at 1557-58.
98. 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
99. Id. at 506.
100. Id. at 513.
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The defendants' encouragement of uploading, and their "constructive knowledge
that infringing activity was likely to be occurring on their BBS," served as the basis
for their liability for contributory infringement.'0 '
In Sega Enterprises,Ltd. v. Maphia0 2 subscribers to defendants' BBS could
download unauthorized copies of Sega's video games.' 3 While the court
acknowledged that the defendants'participation initially appeared insubstantial
because he did not upload or download the files, or directly cause such uploading
or downloading to occur,'" the court concluded: "[the defendant's] role in copying,
including providing facilities, direction, knowledge, encouragement, and seeking
profit, amounts to aprimafaciecase of contributory copyright infringement."1*5 As
in Frena,the scope, purpose, and effects of the unauthorized copying precluded a
fair use argument by the defendants: they had intended to allow others to make
copies rather than buy authorized ones, and thereby to deprive Sega of a profit.' 6
Moreover, the video game programs were "for entertainment uses and involve
fiction and fantasy," thereby tilting the scale against the success of a fair use
defense.' 7 Finally, the BBS allowed the copying of entire programs.' 3
The result might be different if the operator of the BBS does not encourage the
uploading and downloading of copyrighted material by subscribers, or review or
edit such material. For example, in Religious Technology Centerv. Netcom Online
Communication Services, Inc.! 9 a group holding copyrights in various material
related to the spiritual teachings of Scientology sued the operator of a BBS and the
Internet service provider of the BBS for allowing a BBS subscriber to upload some
of these works."' The court acknowledged that

101. Id. at 514.
102. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
103. Id. at 927.
104. Id. at 932.

105. Id. at 933.
106. Id. at 934.
107. Id.
108. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. at 935.

109. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
110. Id. at 1365-66. Specifically, the court found that
Erlich [the subscriber] connects to Klemesrud's BBS using a telephone and a
modem. Erlich then transmits his messages to Klemesrud's computer, where they
are automatically briefly stored. According to a prearranged pattern established
by Netcom's software, Erlich's initial act of posting a message to the Usenet
results in the automatic copying of Erlich's message from Klemesrud's computer
onto Netcom's computer and onto other computers on the Usenet. In order to ease
transmission and for the convenience of Usenet users, Usenet servers maintain
postings from news groups for a short period of time-eleven days for Netcom's
system and three days for Klemesrud's system. Once on Netcom's computers,
messages are available to Netcom's customers and Usenet neighbors, who may
then download the messages to theirown computers. Netcom's local servermakes
available its postings to a group of Usenet servers, which do the same for other
servers until all Usenet sites worldwide have obtained access to the postings,
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there is no question after MAI that "copies" were created, as [the
subscriber's] act of sending a message to [the BBS] caused reproductions
of portions of plaintiffs' works on both [the BBS operator's] and [the
Internet service provider's] storage devices. Even though the messages
remained on their systems for at most eleven days, they were sufficiently
"fixed" to constitute recognizable copies under the Copyright Act."'
Yet the court found that the Internet service provider had not caused the
copying because neither the Internet service provider nor the BBS operation had
initiated the copying, but instead both had been configured to make temporary
copies of any information contributed by a user."' Thus, the court held that "the
storage on a defendant's system of infringing copies and retransmission to other
servers is not a direct infringement by the BBS operator of the exclusive right to
3
reproducethe work where such copies are uploaded by an infringing user.""
To the extent that these decisions address the liability of a BBS operator for
direct or contributory copyright infringement, they appear less relevant to owners
of web sites who generally maintain control over the site's content and links.
However, one could argue that a site owner is the equivalent of a BBS operator in
circumstances where the site links to an infringing site or perhaps even to a site that
itself is linked to an infringing site. Just as the BBS operator can be charged with
a contributory copyright violation by making available material that the operator did
not personally investigate, so could the site owner be held liable.
2. Infringement Through Web Sites
As of February 1, 1997, only two reported decisions had dealt with copyright
infringement by a web site owner." 4 Although both courts looked to the BBS cases
for guidance, neither of the decisions directly addressed infringement caused by an
unauthorized link. Yet they provide initial clarification of two related issues:
whether a web site operator infringes copyrights by posting material on a site; and

which takes a matter of hours.
Id. at 1367-68.
111. Id. at 1368.
112. Id. (footnote omitted).
The court believes that [the Internet provider's] act of designing or implementing
a system that automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data
sent through it is not unlike that of the owner of a copying machine who lets the
public make copies with it. Although some of the people using the machine may
directly infringe copyrights, courts analyze the machine owner's liability under
the rubric of contributory infringement, not direct infringement.

Id. at 1369.
113. Id. at 1371.
114. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. I11.
1997);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997).

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 49:651

whether the technology underlying web-linking results in the transmission of a
"copy" of digital material.

a. Infringement Through Web-Site Posting
In Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc.," 5 a blend of the Frenaand
Religious Technology Center decisions, Playboy sued for copyright infringement
the operator of a web site that allowed subscribers to view adult images for a
monthly subscription fee.' 16 As in Frena,the images were undisputed copies of
those found in Playboy's magazines." ' However, the court distinguished the
function ofthe web site owner from that of the Internet service provider in Religious
Technology Center who was paid to provide Internet access." 8 The site owner in
this case was not a mere conduit for information but instead the selector and
provider of adult images. The court stated:
[The site owner] surely has control over the images it chooses to sell on the
Neptics' website. Even the absence of the ability to exercise such control,
however, is no defense to liability. If a business cannot be operated within
the bounds ofthe Copyright Act, then perhaps the question of its legitimate
existence needs to be addressed." 9
Accordingly, the court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 2
b.

Web-Linking Involves Copying

In Marobie-FL,Inc. v. NationalAssociationofFireEquipment Distributors'
Marobie alleged that the National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors
(NAFED) had made available through its web site files ofcopyrighted and digitized
"cliP art" developed by Marobie for use by people in the fire service industry.' 2 In

115. 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
116. Id. at 1173.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1175.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 1177.
121. 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Marobie also sued Northwest Nexus, Inc., NAFED's
Web service provider. The court observed that:
Pursuant to a contract between NAFED and Northwest, Northwest provided a
host computer for NAFED's Web Page and the access link or connection of

NAFED's Web Page to Web users. Earl E. Robisheaux("Robisheaux"), the
administrator of NAFED's Web Page, placed certain files on the Northwest
computer for NAFED's Web page. Once placed on Northwest's computer for

NAFED's Web page, the files were available to be downloaded by Web users.
Id. at 1171.
122. Id.
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support of its direct infringement claim against NAFED, Marobie alleged that one
of NAFED's agents had obtained a copy of the clip art and had transferred that
material first to his hard drive and then, through the Internet, to Northwest's hard
drive to become part of NAFED's web site."
Citing Frena and Maphia, the court found that these actions by NAFED
directly infringed Marobie's exclusive right to reproduce the material" as well as
its right to publicly distribute it." The court, in weighing the relevant factors,
rejected NAFED's claim of fair use for the following reasons: NAFED derived
commercial benefit (through promoting itself and attracting advertising revenue)
rather than critical or scholarly benefit from this infringement; the clip art was a
creative rather than a factual work; NAFED had copied in their entirety three of five
separate clip art volumes available; and
the duplication would have an adverse
26
effect on the market for such clip art.'
In suing Northwest for direct and contributory copyright infringement, Marobie
insisted that Northwest had itself made copies of the clip art and had allowed users
to do the same:
When an Internet user requests a file that is posted on NAFED's Web
Page, Northwest's computer sends the information in the requested file to
the user's local computer or Internet address. This process is known as
"downloading" a file. The files on NAFED's Web Page are stored in the
hard drive of Northwest's computer. According to Northwest, when the
information in a requested file is sent to an Internet user, the information
passes in electronic form through the Random Access Memory (RAM) of
[Northwest's] computer. Plaintiff claims that Northwest directly infringed
its copyrights each time an Internet user downloaded one or more of the
files containing plaintiff's clip art because, each time, Northwest's
computer "copied" the files from its hard drive to its RAM. 2'
As the court observed, Northwest acknowledged that its computer automatically
copies the desired file when requested by an Internet user. This copy, located in the
RAM of Northwest's computer, is transmitted to the Internet user.' However,
Northwest argued that because the RAM copy was not "fixed" it did not constitute
a copy for purposes of the Copyright Act. 9
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1175-76.
Marobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1172.
Id. at 1177

129. Id. "Northwest argues that [the copy] isnot 'fixed' because the information is transmitted
'through' RAM and over the Internet at high speed in the electronic form of bytes. According to
Northwest, this process of duplication and transmission happens so quickly that 'typically only a
portion of a file is in RAM at any one time."' Id.
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Citing the Religious Technology Center decision, the court found that the copy
of the clip art files in Northwest's RAM constituted "copying" for purposes of the
Copyright Act.'3 For these purposes, whether the information in this file was
transmitted in pieces that were assembled at the requester's Internet address or
whether, as in Religious Technology Center and MA, all of the information
remained in the defendant's RAM at one time was immaterial. "The fact that a copy
is transmitted after it is created, or even as it is created, does not change the fact that
once an Internet user receives a copy, it is capable of being perceived and thus
'fixed.""..3' Yet the court determined that, like the Internet service provider in
Religious Technology Center, Northwest had
only provided the means to copy, distribute or display plaintiff's works,
much like the owner of a public copying machine used by a third party to
copy protected material. Like a copying machine owner, Northwest did not
actually engage in any of these activities itself. Accordingly, Northwest
may not be held liable for direct infingement 3
Nor would the court grant Marobie summary judgment against Northwest for
when Northwest was
contributory infringement because it was unclear whether and
33
aware that NAFED was infringing copyrighted material.
Like the Webbworld decision,Marobieoffers little comfort to site owners who
knowingly deposit infringing material onto their sites. More significantly, though,
Marobie'sdiscussion of transmission of materials accessible through a web site's
link raises the following question: If, by clicking on a link on the linking site, a
visitor to that site triggers the transmission of information directlyfrom the target
site's computerto the visitor, can the target site claim the linking site itself created
an infringing copy of the target site's information?
The owners of the linking site could argue that in this situation they are less
subject to liability than the Internet service providers in the Religious Technology
Center and Marobiedecisions. If those intermediate parties could be compared to
the blameless operators of photocopying machines, the owner of a linking site can
be characterized as merely directing people to information that other people had
made available for photocopying by any interested person. This argument rests on
the premise that the owner of a web site grants the entire world an implied license'
to link to it (or, in the copy-shop metaphor, to those who would like to photocopy
it). If successful, this argument would appear to clear linkers from any liability for

130. Id. at 1178.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Marobie-FL,983 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
134. Few would argue that the material placed on a web site is, by virtue of its being in this
medium, automatically thereby deemed in the "public domain" and thereby subject to no copyright
protection.
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infringement of the target site owner's copyrights to "distribute" and to "publicly
perform" the material on the target site.
3.

The Implied License Defense

Does the owner of a web site grant an implied license to link?
One commentator has characterized the concept of an implied license as "rather
amorphous under copyright law. At its, heart, an implied license is an estoppel
doctrine, arising because the infringing party detrimentally and justifiably relied on
the intellectual property owner's actions."'35 But in one of the leading cases on
implied licenses, Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 36 the Ninth Circuit disagreed,

finding that a party had "cite[d] no authority for the proposition that an implied
to us to be a creature of law, much like any
license is equitable in nature; it' seems
37
other implied-in-fact contract.'
The "implied-in-fact" contract would generally not seem to arise between
strangers. Inthe handful of reported cases on implied licenses, the parties asserting
an implied license each had been directly involved in commercial transactions with
the plaintiffs. To this extent, a site owner's assertion of an implied license to link
to any other site on the World Wide Web conceivably is a claim of a "drive-by
implied license" and thus even more tenuous.
For instance, in Effects Associates the court observed that although the
Copyright Act generally requires a "transfer of copyright ownership" to be in
writing, 38 nonexclusive licenses are specifically exempted from the definition of
such transfers.'39 The court also noted an authoritative treatise's recognition that
"'nonexclusive licenses may... be granted orally, or may even be implied from
conduct."" 4 Thus, the court held that a special effects company that delivered
specially commissioned footage to a film maker without also supplying a written
license or assignment had granted an implied nonexclusive license to the film maker
to use the footage. To hold otherwise would have implied that the company's
"contribution to the film was 'of minimal value,' a conclusion that can't be squared
that [the film maker] paid [the defendant] almost $56,000 for this
with the fact
141
footage."'

135. See Eric Schlachter, The IntellectualPropertyRenaissancein Cyberspace: Why Copyright

Law CouldBe Unimportanton the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15,46 n.104 (1997).
136. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 559 n.7.
138. Id. at 556 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1988)).

139. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
140. Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 558 (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMERON COPYRIGHT § 10.03[A], at 10-36 (1989)).
141. Id. at 559. The court held that its ruling was controlled by Oddo v. Ries,743 F.2d 630 (9th
Cir. 1984). EffectsAssocs., 908 F.2d at 558. In Oddo the court held that by preparing and handing over
to Oddo's business partner, Ries, a manuscript intended for publication that, if published, would
infringe on Oddo's copyright in the material, Oddo "impliedly gave the partnership a license to use...
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The EffectsAssociates court, emphasizing the simplicity of the writing required
to transfer copyright,' 42 rejected the film maker's argument that his industry should
not be bound by this requirement, an assertion that Judge Kozinski "summarized,
tongue in cheek, as: Moviemakers do lunch, not contracts."' 43 A similar reception
might well be afforded to the owner of a web site who claims that such formalities
could be dispensed with in the freewheeling culture of the Intemet. A court faced
with a defense of implied license to a copyright infringement claim would likely
look to the following "several objective factors" identified by the Ninth Circuit to
determine such a license's existence and extent: "the language of the copyright
registration certificate; the letter agreement [between the parties], and deposition
testimony; and the delivery of the copyrightedmaterial
without warning that its
144
further use would constitute copyright infringement.'
In this regard, an implied license "'arises out of the objective conduct of the
parties, which a reasonable man would regard as indicating that an agreement has
been reached.""9145 Or, in the words of another court, "[t]he creation of an implied
license, as in the creation of any implied contract, requires a meeting of the
minds."' 146 One commentator, though, has suggested that "an author's decision to

the manuscript, for without such alicense, Oddo's contribution to the partnership venture would have
been of minimal value." Oddo, 743 F.2d at 634.
142. Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 557 (indicating that "Section 204's writing requirement is not
unduly burdensome; it necessitates neither protracted negotiations nor substantial expense.... [The
writing] doesn't have to be the Magna Charta; a one-line pro forma statement will do").
143. Id. at 556.
144. I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); see, e.g.,
MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769,779 (3d Cir. 1991)
(inferring from circumstances not only the existence but the scope of a license: "The record does not
anywhere indicate that Mr. MacLean gave Mercer the type of broad, nonexclusive license that Mercer
would have needed to protect, against Mr. MacLean's copyright infringement claims, its act of
incorporating [his software program] into [their own competing] program"); Gracen v. Bradford Exch.,
698 F.2d 300,303 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding a genuine issue ofmaterial fact concerning whether a movie
studio's invitation to an artist to enter a competition for the best painting, modeled on the studio's
photographs, ofJudy Garland's Dorothy in The WizardofOz constituted the grant ofan implied license
to the artist to create and exhibit a derivative work); Irwin v. American Interactive Media, Inc., 31
U.S.P.Q.2d 1366, 1369 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that, under the Effects criteria, plaintiff's creation
for and delivery to defendant of an "underscore" soundtrack for defendant's promotional video created
an implied nonexclusive license to use the underscore in the video); Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F.
Supp. 33, 39 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (concluding from the circumstances that a map maker gave a county fire
marshal an implied license to reproduce a copyrighted map of the county for the limited purpose of
making a Fire Zone Map).
145. Allen-Myland v. IBM Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520,549 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting Medeco Sec.
Locks, Inc. v. Lock Tech. Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 519,524 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)); see, e.g., Johnson v. Jones,
921 F. Supp 1573, 1584 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (indicating that "a determination of whether the parties'
conduct created an implied license requires an examination ofthe intent ofthe parties" and determining
that the language of the contracts at issue clearly established no such intent).
146. N.A.D.A. Servs. Corp. v. Business Data of Va., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 44,49 (E.D. Va. 1986);
see e.g., Foreign Car Parts, Inc. v. Auto World, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 977, 980 (M.D. Pa.1973) (rejecting
implied license defense where "the conduct of the Plaintiff in this case indicates that it specifically
withheld from Defendant permission to use [Plaintiffs copyrighted] brochures").
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make a work of authorship available on a Web site likely would be an influential
factor in evaluating whether some implied licenses were thereby granted to users
accessing the work via the World Wide Web."' 7 Nonetheless, the commentator
acknowledges that "it may be more difficult to determine whether, based on all of
the facts and circumstances, a broader license should be implied, such as a license
permitting... copies to be... distributed to third parties.' 48
Indeed, the following three factors militate against an implied license for links:
(1)the target site owner's not preparing the site's material specifically for the owner
of the linking site; (2) the absence of a "meeting of the minds" between the owners
of the linking and target sites; and (3) the absence of payment offered to the target
site's owner by the owner of the linking site. In fact, by creating a link to a specific
page or pages of the target site, the linking site may actually, as in the cases
discussed in Part II, be deprivingthe target site of revenue from advertisements on
the target site that visitors from the linking site can now bypass.
Although a number of sites have attempted to negate any implied license by
inserting explicit language into the "Terms of Use" pages of their sites, the relative
inconspicuousness ofmany of these disclaimers may render them unenforceable.' 49
Moreover, given the relatively short attention span of web surfers, from amarketing
standpoint site designers may be reluctant to implement "Web-wrap" agreements,
which force the viewer to view screens containing various legal terms and to agree
to such terms by clicking the mouse or typing "I agree" before proceeding further
into the site. 5 ° A more efficient means of attempting to negate an implied license
is offered in Part VI of this Article.
B. Infringement by UnauthorizedCreationofDerivative Works andthe Fair
Use Defense
Could the owner of the target site argue that by linking to his site the owner of
the linking site had created an infringing derivative work?'.' In a number of recent
decisions, courts have diverged on the standard for identifying a derivative work,

147. Allen R. Grogan, ImpliedLicensinglssuesin the Online World, THE COMPUTERLAw., Aug.
1997, at 6, available in LEXIS, Computer/Communication News Library, Current File.
148. Id.
149. See generally id. at 7 (querying "[t]o be effective, should such legends appear prominently
at the top of the Web page, rather than (as is often the case) at the bottom ofthe Web page, 'below the
fold,' so that a user has to scroll down through the entire page before encountering such a legend, which
often appears in a tiny type size?"). For a detailed examination of the implications of the
inconspicuousness of legal terms even on such relatively sophisticated commercial web sites as those
of Fortune 500 companies, see Effross, supra note 1.
150. Grogan, supra note 147, at 8; see also Effross, supra note l(exploring the competing

considerations of retaining site visitors and enforcing legal terms).
151. See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that "[b]y editing or cropping plaintiff's artworks and presenting the unauthorized modified
version, defendants have.., violated plaintiff's exclusive right to prepare derivative works").
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especially with regard to the definition of such a work as taking "any
other form in
152
which [the original] work may be recast, transformed or adapted."'
These decisions concern whether derivative (and thereby infringing) works are
created by a party that has incorporated another's copyrighted work into a different
physical framework. The Ninth Circuit, determining that "the language 'recast,
transformed, or adapted' seems to encompass other alternatives besides simple art
reproduction,"'' held that "[by] borrowing and mounting [on a tile the plaintiff's]
preexisting, copyrighted individual art images without the consent of the copyright
proprietors ...appellant has prepared a derivative work and infringed the subject
copyrights.' 54
In similar circumstances, two district courts in the Ninth Circuit followed this
approach. 5 The first court emphasized that
[p]lacing a print or painting in a frame and covering it with glass does not
recast or transform the work of art. It is commonly understood that this
amounts to only a method of display. Moreover, it is a relatively simple
matter to remove the print or painting and display it differently if the owner
chooses to do so. Neither of these things is true of the art work affixed to
a ceramic tile.'56
Nonetheless, the second district court found that a derivative work had been created
57
even when the defendants had only matted and framed the plaintiff's art prints.
In resolving another case involving the same defendant's practice of mounting
copyrighted works on tiles, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's

152. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
153. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988).
154. Id. at 1343. The appellant bought artwork prints or books and glued individual pages or
images onto amat of black plastic to provide a backing and a narrow margin. Then, the appellant glued
the black sheet onto a rectangular white ceramic tile, applied a transparent film over the print, black
sheet, and ceramic tile surface, and sold the finished product in the retail market. Id. at 1342.
155. Greenwich Workshop, Inc. v. Timber Creations, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that "defendants' matted and framed bookplates do infringe plaintiff's copyrights in
both the artwork [featured in plaintiff's book] and the book [itself]"); Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T.
Co., 829 F. Supp. 309, 314 (D. Alaska 1993), aft'd, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that in
a situation involving defendant's placing plaintiff's copyrighted notecards on ceramic tiles and covering
them with a transparent layer of acrylic or epoxy, under MirageEditions the defendant's "process of
transferring art images to tiles does constitute the creation of a derivative work of art in violation ofthe
copyright laws").
156. Munoz, 829 F. Supp. at 314. In its affirmance, the Ninth Circuit stated that "A.R.T.'s
position ignores the distinction drawn in this circuit between conventional framing and A.R.T.'s
ceramic tiling process which the district court properly held to constitute a derivative work." Munoz,
No. 93-35743, 1994 WL 574156, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 1994).
157. Greenwich Workshop, 932 F. Supp. at 1215 (observing that "[d]efendants' infringement is
particularly evident in the context of the copyrighted book, which defendants have clearly 'recast' and
'transformed' by physically removing the pages and adapting them into works of art to hang on the
wall").
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approach in Lee v. A .T. Co."' Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook affirmed
the district court's conclusion that the defendant's mounting of the plaintiff's
artworks on tile did not constitute an "original work of authorship" but instead was
comparable to placing a frame on a painting or putting a medallion in a velvet
case." 9 If framing or casing does not create a derivative work, then neither should
mounting, much less using epoxy resin in binding the original work to its

mounting. 6 To the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit's test implies that "any
alternation ofawork, however slight, requires the author's permission" and thereby

establishes "through the back door an extraordinarily broad version of authors'

moral rights."'1'
If one site provides links to a page or pages of another without any framing,
such as that found in Shetland Times, a strong argument can be made that the target
site's information has not been recast, transformed, or adapted and thus that the
linked site has not created an infringing derivative work. 62 However, if framing is
involved, the argument for infringement under this standard grows much stronger
because the linking site has transplanted information from the framing site into the
context of the linking site. Distinguishing digital from nondigital framing is the fact
that a framed page from the target site is not only surrounded on the visitor's
computer screen with information supplied by the linking site but also is figuratively
surrounded, from the navigational point of view of a web surfer, by the remainder
ofthe linking site as well as by any other material to which the frame or the rest of

158. 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
159. Id. at581.
160. Id. (noting that "[o]ur district judge thought this a distinction without a difference, and we
agree" and that "the ninth circuit erred in assuming that normal means of mounting and displaying art
are easily reversible"); see Lee v. Deck the Walls, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 576, 579-80 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(finding the Munoz court's "proffered distinctions between framed art and 'tiled art' unconvincing and
without support [because b]oth framing and tiling utilize the same works purchased from the copyright
holder and do not involve 'copying' as defined by the Copyright Act"). In Deck the Walls, as support
for its position the district court cited one of the leading treatises on copyright, which attacked the
Miragecourt's decision by noting that"choosing ceramicrather than cardboard as the backing material
should scarcely be construed as a 'meaningful' variation in the eyes of the Copyright Act" and the
Munoz court's opinion by observing that even if framing were only a matter of display and very simple
to accomplish, "the question remains unanswered how tile-mounting creates ameaningful variation that
itself could support copyright protection." Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. at 579-80 n.2 (quoting 1
MEL VILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NmvIMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.03, at 3-13 (1997)); see also
Precious Moments, Inc. v. La Infantil, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D.P.R. 1997) (following the Deck the
Walls court's rejection of "Mirageand the subsequent cases [as reading] the originality requirement
out of the definition of 'derivative work' and open[ing] the door for the most trivial of modifications
to generate an infringing derivative work").
161. Lee, 125 F.3d. at 582.
162. E.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 821 (D. Kan.
1989) (rejecting a copyright infringement claim of a motion picture producer against a company which
placed advertisements atthe beginning ofvideotapes rented by consumers, and concluding that "[w]hile
defendants' advertisement is an original work, the court does not recognize the addition of it to a
videocassette in any way recasting, transforming, or adapting the motion picture. The result is not anew
version of the motion picture").
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the linking site is linked. Even if the linking site is found to have created an
infinging derivative work by framing or otherwise incorporating material from the
target site, it may be able to raise a "fair use" defense under § 107 of the Copyright
1 63
Act.
Litigation in this area will undoubtedly raise analogies to the controversy over
"digital sampling," a method by which recording artists use specialized equipment
and computer programs to record sounds in digitized form, alter them, and mix them
with sounds from other sources."6 Although this procedure can be applied in
relatively benign ways-for example, to "polish" the sounds of participants in a
recording-three reported decisions and numerous law review articles have
addressed its application to the more controversial practice of incorporating into
6
new songs sound clips, riffs, or "hooks" from established hit recordings.' 1
When compared to sampling cases, though, the extent of the alleged
infringement through web-linking would probably be easier to determine. The links
themselves would indicate the source of the copyright infringement claim, and
would make it fairly easy to derive a measurement for the third fair use factor: "the
amount and substantiality of the portion [of the plaintiff's copyrighted work] used

163. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); e.g., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429,1434
(6th Cir. 1992) (indicating that § 107 of the Copyright Act "takes from a copyright owner the exclusive
rights to his work insofar as a derivative, or allegedly infringing work, is a 'fair use' of the copyrighted
work").
164. See generally Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche: DigitalSampling, Intermediate
Copying,Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT.L. REV.271,276 (1996) (observing:
[a]lthough digital sampling is functionally similar to magnetic tape recording in
so far as it captures and stores sounds that may be later retrieved, it provides far
more control over the captured sound than does traditional analog recording
methods. Modem sampling technology enables artists to isolate and record
specific aspects, and even particular instruments, within an existing musical
recording);
Randy S. Kravis, Does a Song by Any OtherName Still Soundas Sweet?: DigitalSampling and Iis
CopyrightImplications, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 231,237-38 (1993) (indicating that
[uln the digital recording stage, analog sound waves from sound recordings are
converted into digital codes that are intelligible to a digital computer. Once in this
form, the sounds can then be altered and manipulated by rearranging the codes.
Finally, those sounds are played back and mixed with other songs with the touch
of a keyboard).
165. See Acuff-Rose Music, 929 F.2d at 1439 (concluding, in the case of a rap music group's
sampling elements of the 1964 Roy Orbison classic, "Oh, Pretty Woman," that "[i]t is the blatantly
commercial purpose of the derivative work that prevents this parody from being a fair use"); Jarvis v.
A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 292 (D.N.J. 1993) (stating that "[t]here is no question that the
combined phrase 'ooh ooh ooh ooh... move.., free your body' is an expression of an idea that [is]
copyrightable," and denying defendant sampler's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's musical
composition copyright infringement claim because the extent ofsimilarity ofdefendant's and plaintiff's
songs was an issue of fact for the jury); Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780
F. Supp. 182, (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing, in granting plaintiff's application for preliminary injunction
against defendants, plaintiffs copyright and testimony and defendant samplers' vain attempt to obtain
license for use of copyrighted material).
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in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole .... ." In different situations, the
work at issue could be a single page, a few pages, or the plaintiff's entire site.
In the case of a commercial link by the defendant, both the first and fourth fairuse factors weigh against a finding of fair use. The first factor concerns "the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,"'67 while the fourth factor concerns
"the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."'65 In the commercial-link context, the phrase "potential market for" might
be extended to include the plaintiff's ability to obtain paid advertising on its site, an
ability that can be dramatically undercut by a defendant's linking to, and possibly
framing, the plaintiffs pages. Conversely, the second factor, "the nature of the
copyrighted work,"' 69 might help a defendant who links to factual works rather than
to creative or fictional works.
C. Violation ofAuthors'Rights
Along with the copyright rights provided in § 107, the Visual Artists Rights Act
grants the author 70 of a work of visual art the rights "to claim authorship of that
work,"'' "to prevent the use ofhis or her name as the author of any work of visual
art which he or she did not create,' 7 2 ".to
prevent the use or his or her name as the
author of the work or visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation,"'" and "to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation... ,,
Web site owners would likely wish to use these rights to challenge unauthorized
linking. However, the Copyright Act defines a "work of visual art" to include only
paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, or photos that exist in physical forms that
have a limited number of physical copies.' Specifically excluded from this

166. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994).
167. Id. § 107 (1).

168. Id. § 107 (4).
169. Id. § 107 (2).
170. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (1994) (providing that "[o]nly the author of awork of visual art
has the[se] rights... in th[e] work, whether or not the author is the copyright owner").
171. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A).

172. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B).
173. Id. § 106A(a)(2)(A).
174. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
175. The Copyright Act defines a "work of visual art" as
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered
by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated
sculptures of200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear
the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
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category are "electronic publication, or similar publication . . ." and "any
merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging

material or container ....
,76 For this reason, the owners of target sites probably
would not find authors' rights helpful unless they were involved in the production

or sale of such works.
IV. THE TRADEMARK MODEL

Under § 1114 of the Lanham Act, 7 ' the registrant of a trademark may obtain

injunctive relief 78 against any person who uses for commercial purposes a
reproduction or imitation of a registered trademark, whether or not it appears on
product wrappers, containers, or signs, "in connection with the sale of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.. ,,179
The registrant of the trademark generally is
not "entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with
knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive."' 80
A separate but overlapping 8 ' cause of action for civil damages resulting from
unfair competition lies under § 1125 against
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). In a nationally publicized application ofthe protections of the Visual Artists
Rights Act, the sculptor Frederick Hart, the creator of Ex Nihilo, a base-relief sculpture prominently
displayed in the Washington National Cathedtal, recently won a settlement from the movie studio that
produced Devil's Advocate, in which his work appeared in an erotic and demonic context. "Warner
Brothers agreed to attach stickers to the videocassette packages of Devil's Advocate specifically
disclaiming any relationship to or endorsement by Hart or Washington National Cathedral. The studio
also agreed to 'make changes to certain portions of the film to eliminate any perceived confusion in
future distribution of the movie."' Sylvia Moreno, Studio Settles Suit Broughtby Va. Sculptor,WASH.
PosT, Feb. 14, 1998, at C8 (quoting Warner Brothers spokeswoman Barbara Brogliatti).

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1994).
Id. § 1114(2)(A).
Id. § 1114(1)(a).
Id. § 1114(1)(b).

181. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena,839 F. Supp. 1552, 1562 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) is designed to protect against a broader range of deceptive
or unfairtrade practices than 15 U.S.C. §1114. In addition, both sections require
the same test to determine whether the particular actions complained of are
violative of their terms. Thus, as a general rule, the same set of facts which
support an action for trademark infringement also support an action for unfair
competition.
Id. (citations omitted).
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device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or associationofsuch personwith another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,or approvalof his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by anotherperson... ."'
Also, the Lanham Act provides that "subject to the principles of equity and upon
such terms as the court deems reasonable,"'' the owner of a "famous mark"' can
obtain an injunction against another person's using the mark or trade name
commercially "if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution ofthe distinctive quality of the mark... .""' If the plaintiff proves that the
other person willfully intended to trade on the name or cause dilution of the mark,
the plaintiff is entitled to damages, any profits made by the defendant, and legal
costs, 86 as well as the destruction of the defendant's infringing documents,
advertisements, and molds for the infringing item's manufacture." r Exceptions exist
for "[flair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner
of the famous mark,... [n]oncommercial
use of a mark... [and] [a]Il forms of
88
news reporting and news commentary."'
Both Frena and Maphia involved trademark infringement and unfair
competition in addition to copyright infringement. In Frena,Playboy's registered
trademarks "Playboy" and "Playmate" had been used to identify many of the
defendant bulletin board service's (BBS) computer files containing adult images;
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
183. Id. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 11995).
184. In determining whether a mark qualifies as "famous,"
a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to-(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;

(3)the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D)the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E)the channels of trade for the goods or services for which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction
is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered [as a trademark].
Id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (Supp. 11995).

185. Id. § 1125(c)(1).
186. Id. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. I 1995); Id. § 1117(a).

187. Id. §§ 1125(c)(2); Id. § 1118 (1994).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C)(4)(A)-(C) (Supp. 11995).
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Playboy's text had been removed from these images, which now bore Frena's name
and the name and telephone number of the BBS. 89 The court held that Frena had
infringed Playboy's trademarks under § 1114 of the Lanham Act for the following
reasons: the trademarks were "well[-]known marks" that "have acquired great
distinctiveness among consumers... ,"othe BBS used the identical marks,' 9' and
"the services both parties provided [i.e., the provision of images of nude women]
were virtually identical."'" Additionally, by "deleting [Playboy's] text from the
photographs, adding his own text to some of the photographs and appropriating
[Playboy's] photographs without attribution to the copyright owner," Frena had
engaged in unfair competition under § 1125.'" 3
InMaphiathecourt granted apreliminary injunction and found that Sega would
likely prevail on the merits in a trademark infringement action. 94 The court stated:
"[w]hen a game copied from Defendants' bulletin board is played, that game begins
with a screen showing the federally registered SEGA trademark and the Sega logo.
Confusion, ifnot on the part ofbulletin board users, is inevitable on the part ofthird
parties who may see the copied games after they enter the stream of commerce.' 95
Sega also established a prima facie case ofunfair competition and false designation
of origin under § 1125.196
However, in Russ Hardenburgh,Inc. the court denied Playboy's motion for
summary judgment against the bulletin board operators." 9 The court decided
Playboy had not shown
that the deceptive or misleading portions of the copied photographs were
material, that is, likely to influence the purchasing decision of BBS
subscribers. [Playboy] has not shown that subscribers to [the defendants'
BBS] were drawn to that system because they believed that the adult
photographs contained therein were created by Defendants. Plaintiff has
not shown that Defendants made any attempt, or had any incentive, to pass
off [Playboy] photographs as if they were created by [defendants], other
than to avoid copyright liability. Plaintiff will need to produce further
evidence at trial to prevail on its Lanham Act claim that Defendants misled
consumers about the source of the images.'98
Apart from any issue of trademark infringement that would arise from the mere

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Playboy Enters., Inc v. Frena,839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
Id. at 1560.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1562.
Maphia, 857 F. Supp. at 689.
Id. at 688.
Id.
PlayboyEnters., Inc v. Russ Hardenburgh,Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 515 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
Id. at515.
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presence of a company's marks on another company's site, it would appear that a
site employing the mark itself as a link-for instance, by asking visitors to click on
another entity's trademarked logo or word in order to gain access to the site of the
owner of that mark-would raise trademark infringement concerns if those seeing
the link, whether they followed it or not, were wrongly led to believe that the linker
was somehow affiliated with the owner of the mark. A trademark infringement
action might also be brought if the link in which the trademarked material were
embedded led without warning to a site directly competitive with that of the
trademark's owner.
V. THE PRIVACY MODELS
In a 1960 law review article'" and in a subsequent edition of his treatise,"'
William Prosser, the dean of torts scholars, enumerated four separate causes of
action for a breach of privacy which were ultimately incorporated by the Second
Restatement of Torts20 ' and, in some form, by the statutes and common law of
different states. 02 This Part analyzes in the context of web-linking two ofProsser's
four privacy torts, "[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye" and "[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness."" 3
A.

The FalseLight Model

An action might lie against unwelcome linkers under the privacy tort of false
light when the linkage-for example, from a web site devoted to obscene or
objectionable material-places the owner of the target site "before the public in a
false light" that is "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and is created with
"reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed." However, because target sites necessarily offer

199. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960).
200. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112 (3d ed. 1964).

201. HANDBOOKOFTHERESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFTORTS §652A (2)(a)-(d) (1977) (providing
that the right of privacy is invaded by unreasonable intrusion, appropriation of another's name or
likeness, unreasonable publicity of another's private life, and publicity which places another in a false
light).
202. However, not every state recognizes all of the privacy rights. See, e.g., Geary v. Goldstein,
831 F. Supp. 269, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that "New York does not recognize an independent
cause of action for the common law 'false light' tort").
203. Prosser, supra note 199, at 389. The two remaining torts, unreasonable intrusion and
unreasonable publication of another's private life, are not implicated by web-linking because one can
argue that anything which a plaintiff displays on his web site is not private. However, if the owner of
the linking site had breached the electronic protections, such as password requirements, that surround
an individual's private site or corporation's internal "intranet," and thereby had allowed outsiders
access to the sites, these causes of action might be relevant.
204. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see also Berkos v. NBC, Inc., 515
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material to the public at large, a linking site that clearly identifies the source of the
material to which it links should escape false light liability.
In his law review article, Prosser noted that false light situations "frequently
[arise from] the use of the plaintiff's picture to illustrate a book or an article with

which he has no reasonable connection."2 5 Indeed, much judicial attention has
recently been devoted to false light allegations based on plaintiffs' claims that
revealing photographs of them appeared in erotic magazines without their
permission. 6 In one of the leading false light cases, Douglassv. HustlerMagazine,
Inc., 7 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit observed that "this little niche of the
law of privacy is dominated by Larry Flynt's publications. 2 3
In Douglassthe plaintiff, an actress and model, had posed for pictorials that
were represented to her as intended for publication in Playboy magazine. She had
signed releases authorizing the magazine to use the photos for any purpose that it
saw fit, including assigning or licensing the magazine's rights to the images. 0 9
Although some of the photographs did appear in Playboy, the photographer
subsequently gained employment with Hustler and published additional
photographs in that magazine, apparently without authorization from Playboy or
Douglass." ° The plaintiff, in the interim, posed several more times for Playboyand
appeared in television commercials and programs, as well as in motion
pictures-notably, BreakingAway.21' She sued for a false light invasion of privacy,
asserting that Hustler'spublication of her photographs, some ofwhich pictured her
"engaged in erotic play with the other woman in the pictorial,"2 2 falsely implied
N.E.2d 668, 680 (I11.
App. Ct.1987) (finding that ajudge's complaint against a television network for

implying his connection with ajudicial corruption scandal satisfied the Restatement ofTort's false light
standard); Prosser, supranotel99, at 400 (indicating that "[tlhe false light need not necessarily be a
defamatory one, although it very often is.... It seems clear, however, that it must be something that
would be objectionable to the ordinary reasonable man under the circumstances ....The interest
protected is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation").
205. See Prosser, supranote 199, at 399.
206. E.g., Rebecca Quick, Can'tGet There From Here May Be Web's New Motto, WALL. ST.

J:, July 2, 1997, at B6 (quoting intellectual property and computer law lawyer as saying that "[a] lot
of our clients get upset with pornography sites linking to them-they don't want that kind of

connection").
The act of accepting a paid product placement diametrically opposes the conduct that gives rise
to a false light claim. See, e.g., William Benjamin Lackey, Comment, Can Lois Lane Smoke
Marlboros?: An Examination ofthe ConstitutionalityofRegulatingProductPlacement in Movies,
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275, 276 (1993) (characterizing product placement as "a classic case of one

hand washing the other: filmmakers defray production costs while manufacturers gain access to a
massive advertising market"); Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies andProductPlacement. IsHollywood
Turning Films into Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 301, 305-308 (1992) (enumerating

instances of product placement in movies, television shows, and novels).
207. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
208. Id. at 1137.
209. Id. at 1131.
210. Id. at 1131-32.
211. Id. at 1131.
212. Id. at 1134.
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both that she was a lesbian and that "she is the kind of person willing to be shown
2'13
naked in Hustler."

As the court noted, "[t]he false-light tort, to the extent distinct from the tort of
defamation (but there is indeed considerable overlap), rests on an awareness that
people who are made to seem pathetic or ridiculous may be shunned, and not just
'
people who are thought to be dishonest or incompetent or immoral."214
After
reviewing the photographs and noting the "palpable" differences between Playboy
and Hustler,"' the Court concluded that Douglass did have a cause of action against
Hustler for false light invasion of privacy: "We cannot say that it would be

irrational for a jury to find that in the highly permissive moral and cultural climate
prevailing in late twentieth-century America, posing nude for Playboy is consistent
with respectability for a model and actress but that posing nude for Hustler is not
(not yet, anyway) ..... 216

What of the fact that Douglass had given Playboy a general release for the
photographs, presumably anticipating that the photographs might end up in Hustler
or in publications perhaps even more objectionable? The Court found that "the risk

she took and the risk that materialized were not the same. She took what may have
seemed a trivial risk that Playboy would resell her photographs to a competitor, not
the risk that the competitor would steal them. 217

Significantly for owners of linking sites, the photographs in Douglasshad not
been previously published. The Seventh Circuit observed that "[i]fa photograph has
been published previously the implied representation that its present publication is
with the consent of the subject is weakened; the first publication may have put the
photograph in the public domain. 2 8 In fact, a subsequent Fifth Circuit case found

213. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135.
214. Id. at 1134. The court, though pointing to the obviously posed nature of the pictorials,
indicated that a reasonable jury might falsely infer from the photographs that Douglass was a lesbian.
Id. at 1135.
215. Id. at 1137 (observing that "Playboy,like Hustler,contains nude pictorials, but the erotic
theme is generally muted .... And unlike Hustler,Playboy does not carry sexual advertisements, does
not ridicule racial or religious groups, and avoids repulsive photographs...

216. Id.
217. Id. at 1138. In this situation, Hustler was bound by its photographer's knowledge that
Douglass had not signed the requisite releases. Id. at 1139-1140. However, the magazine's false light
liability could also be grounded in its failure to implement proper systems for securing the subjects'
permission. In Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984), the magazine was found
liable in a false light action brought by a plaintiff whose nude photos, taken by her husband, had been
stolen, submitted to, and published in a Hustler column that printed photographs voluntarily supplied
to the magazine by its readers. The court noted: "the record prominently shows that Hustler carelessly
administered a slipshod procedure.. !" even though "[tlhe wanton and debauched sexual fantasies and
the intimate photos of nude models [displayed in the column] were of such a nature that great care was
required in verifying a model's consent." Id. at 1092.
218. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1136. Cf Kyser-Smith v. Upscale Communications, Inc., 873 F.
Supp. 1519, 1527 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (determining that ajury could find that an advertisement featuring
the plaintiff as "an attractive young woman in a red-sequin, low-cut dress advertising a product with
the name 'HOT SIX OIL' in large capital letters strewn across the top to be highly offensive" and that,
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that Hustler's reprinting of nude photographs from a book that the magazine was
19
reviewing did not give rise to a false light cause of action against the magazine.
Because any web site or page has already been published by the owner of that site,
any web site linking to this material should not be vulnerable to a false light claim.
In fact, the linking site is arguably not even reprinting the target's material, but only
allowing visitors to the linking site the opportunity to have the target itself print for
them a copy of its own material.
In this context, clear identification of the prior publication may insulate a
reprinter from false light liability. For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
found thatPenthouseMagazine,which had reprinted a local newspaper's article and
photograph about one school's segregation of young boys and girls at recess, had
not thereby implied "either consent or endorsement" of the girls who appeared in
the photograph.' 2 Not only had these items appeared in a column that was "clearly
described as 'a compendium' of items 'culled from the nation's press"' but "the
narrative... was clearly labeled as having been taken from a newspaper and
submitted by an Oregon reader '" 2 Also, the Penthouse column's editor "[n]ot only
...place[d] his comment after the story and its attribution, and in a different
typeface, but he expressly attributed the comment to himself."' m This decision
implies that linking sites should take care to indicate, perhaps next to the relevant
links themselves, the source of the material to which the visitor who follows the
links will be led. For example, a web site could state the following: "Click here for
a view ofthe home page of [company name]," or provide a highlighted link bearing
the name ofthe other page indicating that the page was not produced by the linking
site. This concern is particularly important with respect to frames, which should
clearly identify the source of any framed material that was not created by the framer.
Finally, as in libel and defamation cases, the defendant may be able to raise
a defense that the plaintiff is a "public figure," and thus damages are inappropriate
unless the defendant published an untrue statement-or created an embarrassing

because the plaintiff had not signed a release form for the use of the photograph, the advertiser had
recklessly used the plaintiff's photograph in the advertisement).
219. Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 799 F.2d 1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that "no
reasonable person could consider the photographs as indicating plaintiffs' approval of Hustler,or that
they were willing to pose nude for Hustler.It is obvious that the photographs were reproductions from
the books being reviewed or excerpted. No tie to Hustler is claimed or suggested").
220. Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1019 (lst Cir. 1988).
221. Id.
222. Id. (concluding that "there was absolutely no room for the implication that Penthousehad
in any way dealt with plaintiffs [the pictured schoolgirls and their parents], or they with Penthouse");
see also Grimsley v. Guccione, 703 F. Supp. 903, 910-911 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (similarly rejecting a false
light claim based on a newspaper clipping reproduced in the same Penthouse column).
223. E.g., Wood, 736 F.2d at 1091 (concluding that "a Texas court would apply no different
standard of care to a false light claim than it would to a defamation action"); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d
245, 250 (5th Cir. 1984) (indicating that "[i]t has become obvious, with the expansion of privacy law,
that a 'false light' invasion of privacy action will often arise from the same circumstances which yield
a cause of action for defamation").
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link-with "actual malice." 4 Of particular relevance to the Web is the concept of
a "limited public figure," or a person who "has: (1) successfully invited public
attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is the
subject of litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy
related to the subject of the litigation; (3) assumed a position of prominence in the
public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and continuing access to the
media." For example, in finding for the defendant, the Second Circuit determined
that the author, Jackie Collins Lerman, was a limited public figure with respect to
her complaint against a magazine that falsely identified her as the actress who
appeared topless and in an orgy scene in still photographs reprinted by the magazine
from a film written by the plaintiff and her husband 26
Because the creator of any web site has arguably made himself into a limited
public figure with regard to the issues with which the site deals, it would appear
difficult to create a link to that site with actual malice, unless the link involved a
misrepresentation of the content of the target site or of the views of its creator, or
connects the site to an issue or topic that the site does not address. For example, the
linking site might create a spurious set of links to web pages of individuals whom
it falsely portrayed as users of a pharmaceutical drug that reversed impotence, or
visitors to a particular web site.

224. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that a
"public official" cannot recover damages from the state for a defamatory falsehood with respect to his
official conduct unless the official can prove "that the statement was made with 'actual malice,'--that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"); cf
Braun, 726 F.2d at 257 (holding that in the context of a private figure, a finding of malice was
supported by testimony that an adult magazine's employees "acted with entire disregard for the falsity
of their portrayal.. ." of the plaintiff in publishing her photograph, and especially by testimony that
they "misrepresented the nature of the magazine to [the plaintiff's employer, a family entertainment
park] in order to obtain transparencies of the picture for publication"); Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co.,
518 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (D.C. 1981) (holding that, just as in defamation actions, "[a]s plaintiffis not
a public figure .... a negligence standard applies to the accuracy of the statements in his false light
claim").
225. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2nd Cir. 1984); see also Fitzgerald v.
Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 585, 603 (D. Md. 1981) (holding that
[g]iven the close theoretical relationship between a claim for defamation and a
'false light' suit for invasion of privacy.... when a plaintiff, who is a limited
public figure with regard to a defamation claim, also sues under a false light
theory that has as its factual basis the same allegedly false material, that plaintiff
must prove actual malice in order to recover on the "false light" claim).
226. Lerman, 745 F.2d at 137 (concluding that

[b]y voluntarily devoting herself to the public's interest insexual mores, through
extensive writing on this topic, reaping profits and wide notoriety for herself in
the process, Ms. Lerman must be deemed to have purposefully surrendered part
of what would otherwise have been her protectable privacy rights, at least those
related in some way to her involvement in writing her books and screenplays).
Also, the court noted that "as a controversial, outspoken authoress and screenwriter advocating equal
nudity [for men in films, Ms. Lerman was] a willing participant in this public controversy" Id.at 138.
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B. The "Right ofPublicity"or "CommercialAppropriation"Model
Unauthorized linkers might possibly find themselves liable on another privacy
ground, that of "right of publicity" or "commercial appropriation," defined by
Prosser as "the appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantage, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness." 7
In Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroad.Co. the Supreme Court acknowledged
that this cause of action "is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright
law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and
having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation." 8 Right of publicity

actions also differ from false light actions "in the degree to which they intrude on
dissemination of information to the public. In 'false light' cases the only way to
protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the damaging
matter, while in 'right of publicity' cases the only question is who gets to do the
publishing." ' As in false light cases involving public figures, an article must be
published or a link must be made in right of publicity situations "with knowledge
or in reckless disregard of its falsity. '

227. See Prosser, supranote 199, at 401. This definition is echoed by the Second Restatement
of Torts, which provides that "[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652C (1977). An early decision indicated the Second Circuit's view that "in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the
publicity value ofhis photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege ofpublishing his picture
.... This right might be called a 'right ofpublicity."' Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
202 F.2d 866, 868 (2nd Cir. 1953) (concerning a baseball player's right to grant to a baseball card
company the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture).
Although under this phrasing misappropriation for commercial purpose is not required, that is
most often the situation; hence, the common equation of right to publicity with commercial
misappropriation. In fact, Commentb to section 652C of the Restatement indicates that"[t]he common
form of invasion of privacy under the rule here stated is the appropriation and use of the plaintiff's
name or likeness to advertise the defendant's business or product, or for some similar commercial
purpose. Apart from statute, however, the rule stated is not limited to commercial appropriation."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cnt. 6 (1977). See also Lerman, 754 F.2d at 133-134
(noting that "the right to publicity is essentially identical to the right to be free from commercial
appropriation .... Because the plaintiff must generally have developed a property interest with
financial value in order to prove that he suffered damages, the right is most frequently invoked by
public figures or celebrities.").
228. 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). See also Prosser, supra note 199, at 406 (stating that
"appropriation is quite a different matter from [other privacy-related causes of action]. The interest
protected is not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and
likeness as an aspect of his identity.").
229. Zacchini,433 U.S. at 573. See also Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350
(Cal. CL App. 1983) (indicating that "[o]rdinarily, only two branches of the law of privacy, namely,
public disclosure and false light, create tension with the First Amendment, because of their intrusion
on the dissemination of information to the public").
230. Eastwood,198 Cal. Rptr. at 352 (finding deficient in this regard movie star Clint Eastwood's
right ofpublicity action against a tabloid newspaper, but observing that "such defect is capable of being
cured by amendment"); Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308,315 (N.Y. App. Div.
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Zacchini involved the plaintiff's suit against a television station for televising
the entirety of his fifteen-second "human cannonball" act, which featured his flight
from the barrel of a cannon to a net two hundred feet away. The Supreme Court
reversed Ohio's highest court's holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
protected this telecast: "The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring
respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it
would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work
without liability to the copyright owner ..... "
For this reason, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff in Douglass, who
was both an actress and professional model who had licensed nude photographs of
herself, had successfully presented not only a false light claim against Hustler
magazine but also a claim "under the commercial-appropriation branch ofthe right
of privacy-what is sometimes called the 'right of publicity."'" 2 However, the
district court in Faloona determined that the magazine's reproduction of nude
photographs of the plaintiffs which appeared in a book that the magazine was
reviewing did not support a claim for commercial misappropriation. The court
stated that "the defendant must have capitalized upon the likeness of that person in
order to sell more magazines or newspapers" and Hustler had not so exploited the
photograph's subjects. 3
Even if a web site, perhaps owned by a human cannonball or nude model,
offers its material-possibly including still or moving images-to the public rather
than to an exclusive group, the site's owner might claim that a link has created
commercial misappropriation. First, as in the case discussed in Part II, the argument
could be made that the linking site was interfering with the target site's ability to
generate income because it was diverting visitors from advertisements which they
would otherwise encounter by browsing through the target site. Clearly, this
argument depends on the linking site's leading visitors directly to an internal page
ofthe target site, framing the target's pages, or otherwise presenting the target site's
pages without allowing the range of navigation and vision offered to visitors
proceeding directly to the target site.

1982) (construing state law to require such proof "where a use is associated with an item that would
generally be considered newsworthy or ofpublic interest and concerns a public official or figure....").
231. Zacchini,433 U.S. at 575.
232. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128,1138 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that "the
jury did not exceed the bounds of reason" in reaching this conclusion, because "[t]he unauthorized
publication did impair the commercial exploitation of Douglass's talents... [and] an important aspect
of the 'right of publicity' is being able to control the place as well as time and number of one's public
appearances").
233. Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1360 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affd, 799
F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that Hustler did not identify the subjects of the photographs and "did
not exploit the photographs in a publicity campaign designed to sell more magazines."); cf Grimsley
v. Guceione, 703 F. Supp. 903, 911 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (finding that Penthouse Magazine had not
appropriated plaintiff's name, story, or photograph for some commercial advantage because it "clearly
had not used the [plaintiff's] story to advertise the contents of its magazine or to increase sales").
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Can a target successfully bring a right to publicity action against a site that links
to the target's home page when it merely deposits visitors at the target's doorstep
and allows them unframed access to the entirety of the target site? The target's
owner might still argue that the presence of this link increases the value of the
linker's site and decreases the value of the sites to which the target's owner grants
a license to link. 4 Such an action would not be successful if the target's mere
presence on the web were taken to imply such a license. However, the impliedlicense argument might not apply if, for instance, the linking site bypassed a
password protection, registration form, or "adult verification service" that acted as
an intermediary between the casual visitor and the contents of the target site. 5
VI. A WAY OUT?
Although the owners of some web sites are mounting sophisticated
technological defenses to unwelcomed web-linking," 6 and owners ofother sites are
including links to "terms and conditions" pages that disclaim responsibility for or
endorsements of sites linking to others, a simple web-wide solution to resolve
several ofthe problems associated with unwelcomed web-linking would be to create
a new icon, perhaps that of a traffic light to be placed on the home page, selected
pages, or all pages of a target site. If the lamp lit on the depicted traffic light were
red, the indication would be that the owner of the web page had not granted
permission to link to or frame that page. A yellow light would indicate that the
owner had granted some sites permission to link to or frame the page. Also, clicking
on the yellow-lighted icon could produce a list of those sites, perhaps in the form
of reciprocal links. A green light would show that the page's owner has granted
everyone on the Web a license to link to or frame that page.
If widely adopted, this concept, similar to the icon for an intact/broken key that
symbolizes a secure/insecure web connection for purposes of electronic commerce,
would fulfill several goals. First, it would remind all visitors that the owners of sites
generally have little technological control over which sites link to theirs. Second,

234. This argument is akin to those launched by individuals who object to companies' selling
their names, addresses, and other personal information to mailing lists.
235. See Effross, supranote I (discussing operation of adult verification services).

236. E.g., Quick, supranote 206, at B6 (observing that
in recent weeks Ticketmaster has escalated [its battle against Microsoft] by using
computer coding to block users from linking to its site from the Sidewalk site.
Users who click on Sidewalk's link to Ticketmaster arrive at a Web page that
reads, 'This is an unauthorized link and a dead end for Sidewalk.' The page tells
users the correct address for Ticketmaster, which must be manually typed into the
browser);
Todd Woody, MediaEmbroiledin HyperlinkingDispute,147 N.J.L.J. 1261 (March 17, 1997) (noting
that the cable network "CNN has inserted a poison pill of sorts in its Web sites that dissolves
TotaINEWS's framer. Ifa viewer goes to the LosAngeles Times site through TotalNEWS, the frames
disappear if the viewer ventures beyond the Times' home page").
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the presence of the icon (which might ultimately become a default feature in some
software packages devoted to web page construction) would eliminate any argument
that the creator of a site had granted an implied license to link. Rather, all such
licenses would have to be explicit, by the inclusion of the linking site's name in the
list that appeared when the visitor clicked on the icon. Third, the simplicity of the
icon and its use would enable a site owner to convey its message in a relatively
unobtrusive way, without annoying or deflecting visitors to the site. 7
Thus, owners of web sites might find an alternative (or addition) to constructing
technological moats, drawbridges, and walls around their digital domains-and
thereby inviting even more determined efforts to scale or breach these ramparts. By
installing a virtual signpost that not only identifies interlopers but enhances the
owner's ability to counterattack, site-owners might more efficiently protect their
reputations and intellectual property in a still-shifting legal landscape.

237. See Effross, supra note 1 (indicating that in the design of commercial web sites, marketing
considerations such as an avoidance of "click-wrap" agreements often triumph over considerations of
legal protection for the site owner); Grogan, supra note 147, at 8 (observing that "[b]ecause [clickwrap] procedures are uncommon.. . and are likely to discourage some users from using the site, the
imposition of such obstacles may well be contrary to the web site host's business goals").

